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



24 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence



VIA: Deputy Director for Intelligence FROM: Douglas J. MacEachin
Director of Soviet Analysis


SUBJECT: INF Treaty Verification Assessment

1. Action. That you consider the recommendation below.  25X1

2. Background. I am in basic agreement with the points that  made to you in his 19 June memo on the subject assessment. SOVA has seen this document many times and has commented extensively on it. While we have had substantive differences with the subject draft, I believe the main problem is in the process--that is, having the DCI commit himself to a verification assessment while the Intelligence Community is still in the process of producing a national estimate of its monitoring capabilities  By doing so, we are prejudging the outcome  and giving assent to a document that is likely to become a surrogate monitoring assessment. While the Intelligence Community does produce ad hoc monitoring assessments on a regular basis, the preferred approach in this case would be to have an NIE on monitoring upon which a verification assessment could be based. 

3. Recommendation. In view of the foregoing, I recommend that:

- the INF Treaty Verification Assessment not be signed at this time
-  be completed as quickly as possible. I am willing to commit to the NIO/SP the resources necessary to accomplish this task. 


Douglas J. MacEachin


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19 June 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chief, Arms Control Intelligence Staff

SUBJECT: INF Treaty Verification Assessment Statement [REDACTED]

1. The attached draft interim statement is for your information only. I do not recommend signature at this time. [REDACTED]

2. For background, you recall that you signed a note with Ken Adelman (Attachment A) on the desirability to issue joint verification assessments. We started this two months ago, following the Terms of Reference provided for in the joint Casey-Adelman letter of 1985 (Attachment B; see paperclip). ACDA did not want to include a section on "military risks" and "safeguards" but, instead, wanted this interim statement on basically monitoring issues (but which they call "verifiability") so that it could at least say the process is underway. [REDACTED]

3. Ken Adelman is very eager for you to co-sign this with him as soon as possible. [REDACTED]

4. We have tried to steer this paper in a direction which would allow you to co-sign it, should you choose to do so. The paper, at the moment, is correct as far as it goes, but is seen by some (especially SOVA) as dwelling on cheating scenarios and those areas where we have monitoring weaknesses. (NIO/SP, however, agrees with the Director of ACDA's bottom line assessment of a three or four out of ten judgment for the treaty.) ACDA, however, is writing the paper to determine how well we can detect Soviet cheating. Therefore, they do not think it is unbalanced. [REDACTED]

5. By signing this paper with Ken Adelman, you would, in effect, be signing a monitoring paper jointly with ACDA. The draft monitoring NIE [REDACTED] deals with some of these subjects but has not yet been circulated for review, let alone agreed to by analysts. This has made our task especially difficult. [REDACTED]

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6. I am showing this paper to you now so that you can be aware of its contents, its context, and its flaws. I believe that your decision to sign will be based on the relationship you want to have with the Director of ACDA. If you choose to sign it, I want to ensure that the paper you sign is balanced, correct, and will have the least chance to come back and haunt us. I think we may be at that point in this paper in about a week. [REDACTED]

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7. In any case, we must make it clear to Ken that this is neither a substitute for the rigorous monitoring work in the draft NIE or for the verification assessment that you and Bill Casey wanted to see done. We would benefit from any comments which you might have at this time. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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Attachments:
As stated

cc: DDI

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